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ABSTRACT
Understanding the evolution of cooperation as part of an
evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) is a di cult problem that
has been the focus of much work. The associated costs of
cooperation may lower the ﬁtness of an organism below that
of its non-cooperating counterpart, allowing the more ﬁt or-
ganism to persist and outcompete the cooperator. Insight
into these behaviors can help provide a better understand-
ing of many aspects of the natural world, as well as provide
future avenues for ﬁghting disease.
In this study, we use digital evolution to examine how
the abundance of a required resource a ects the coopera-
tive production of a public good in an adverse environment.
Evolutionary computation is an excellent tool for examining
these problems, as it o ers researchers complete access to or-
ganisms and total control over their environment. We ﬁnd
that stable cooperation can occur in otherwise competitive
environments at discrete levels corresponding to the avail-
ability of a required resource. When resource levels are low,
organisms focus solely on competitive behaviors. However,
once resource levels cross a critical threshold, cooperation
persists in populations. Further, this cooperation occurs in
patches, where it is most likely to beneﬁt relatives. Finally,
we ﬁnd that in some cases this cooperative behavior allows
organisms to increase their competitive abilities as well.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
H.4 [Information Systems Applications]: Miscellaneous;
F.1.1 [Computation by Abstract Devices]: Models of
Computation—Self-modifying machines
General Terms
Experimentation, Theory
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1. INTRODUCTION
Insight into the evolution of cooperative strategies is crit-
ical in gaining an understanding of many fundamental as-
pects of life, including the emergence of multicellularity [25]
and the evolution of pathogenesis and antibiotic resistance
[7]. Cooperative acts incur some cost on the actor while
providing some beneﬁt to a recipient. In public goods coop-
eration, this beneﬁt is placed into the environment, where
anyone may take advantage of it. Upon ﬁrst glance, the
traditional “survival of the ﬁttest” view of evolution would
select against such behaviors, as other organisms that do not
pay this cost would have higher individual ﬁtness.
One mechanism allowing selection to favor these costly co-
operative acts is kin selection [10], whereby organisms seek
to maximize their inclusive ﬁtness, which considers both the
ﬁtness of that particular organism and the ﬁtness of its kin,
which share either common ancestry or behavior. Because
these organisms have some genetic similarity, the reproduc-
tive successes of an organism’s kin beneﬁt the proliferation of
that organism’s genes as well. This mechanism is captured
in Hamilton’s equation, shown in Equation 1, which states
that cooperation will be selected for when the costs (c) of
the act are less than the beneﬁts (b) conferred upon the re-
cipient multiplied by the genetic relatedness (r) between the
pair [10]. Therefore, cooperation is more likely to occur in
environments with spatial structure, where organisms tend
to interact primarily with close relatives.
c < r   b (1)
Due to the di culties in quantifying the e ects of in-
teractions in higher organisms, as well as their use of ad-
ditional mechanisms such as reciprocity and punishment,
cooperation at this fundamental level is increasingly stud-
ied using populations of microorganisms such as bacteria
and yeast [24]. The short generation times of these or-
ganisms make evolutionary-scale studies feasible. Compu-
tational models of these systems are also frequently used,
providing researchers complete environmental control and
access to each organism [6,8,19].
One area in which cooperative behaviors are critical is in
the formation and maintenance of bioﬁlms [15], which are
aggregates of microorganisms connected within a matrix of
extracellular polymeric substance (EPS) [7]. This “sticki-
ness” allows organisms in bioﬁlms to cohabitate in larger
densities and resist being ﬂushed out of their environment.
In addition, bioﬁlms play a large role in antibiotic resistance,
and can render bacteria 1,000 times less likely to be a ected
by antibiotics [22]. Because this self-produced EPS resource
143is a public good in this system, selection can produce organ-
isms that take advantage of its beneﬁts without producing
it themselves (cheaters). The presence of such cheaters has
been observed to signiﬁcantly weaken bioﬁlms [20].
Indeed, this observation is the basis for current research
in “anti-infective” treatments of bacterial infections. In one
recent study, mutants that do not produce or respond to a
cooperative signaling molecule were introduced into infec-
tions in mice, resulting in a signiﬁcant decrease in virulence
and a corresponding increase in host survival [21]. Simi-
larly, the use of benign or more manageable strains that
can outcompete pathogenic strains has been considered [4].
As a further step, researchers have also proposed employing
“Trojan Horse” techniques, whereby a competitive mutant
strain containing beneﬁcial behaviors is introduced [4]. In
order for such treatments to be e ective (and not harmful to
the host), an intimate knowledge of the social interactions
occurring in bacterial communities is needed.
These interactions depend not only on the organisms and
communities themselves, but also on the environment in
which they live. Often, the costs and beneﬁts are driven
by environmental factors such as disturbance, spatial limi-
tations, and the availability of resource, which is examined
in this work. Environmental disturbance, such as grazing
by a higher trophic level species, can both promote and hin-
der cooperation. It has been observed that cooperation is
maximized at intermediate levels of disturbance, where the
balance between costs and beneﬁts is positive [2]. This is be-
cause at low disturbance, there is less need for cooperative
acts, so their associated beneﬁts are small. At high distur-
bance, organisms are forced to focus on self-preserving be-
haviors, making the costs of cooperation prohibitively high.
In addition, the density of populations supported by the
environment may drive selection for cooperation. Speciﬁ-
cally, as groups grow to carrying capacity, increased compe-
tition among kin may hinder the evolution of cooperation
through increased costs [12, 18]. In facilitation (interspe-
ciﬁc cooperation), it is hypothesized that cooperation may
allow organisms to increase their “realized niche”, thus en-
abling larger and more diverse communities [5]. Here, coop-
erative acts allow a species to survive in environments that
would otherwise be uninhabitable, either environmentally or
through competition.
The availability of a required resource often plays a large
role in determining evolutionary outcomes. As resource be-
comes more abundant, the relative costs of the cooperative
act decrease, allowing organisms to perform cooperative acts
in addition to their self-preserving and competitive activi-
ties. When that resource becomes more scarce, however, or-
ganisms may be forced to focus solely on their own interests.
Wet bench experiments have shown this relationship [3] as
well as a link between resource availability and diversiﬁca-
tion [9].
The study presented here examines this relationship be-
tween available environmental resource and cooperation through
the production of a public good. Populations of digital or-
ganisms evolved in digital environments with di erent re-
source availabilities, and we examined their ability to persist
in an adverse environment through cooperation. In agree-
ment with previous studies of natural organisms [3], we ﬁnd
that the frequency of cooperative organisms increased with
available resource. Further, our study revealed two inter-
esting features of this cooperation not reported previously.
First, that populations cooperate at discrete levels–those in
rich environments cooperate with similar levels of e ort re-
gardless of resource abundance, while those in poor environ-
ments cooperate consistently less. Secondly, we ﬁnd that
success within these two distinct groups remains closely tied
to competition. These ﬁndings provide additional insight
into the environmental conditions under which cooperation
occurs and may be used to help drive the development of
treatments that target similar behaviors in disease.
2. METHODS
For this study, we used the Avida software platform to
study evolution in populations of self-replicating digital or-
ganisms [17]. As depicted in Figure 1, each organism con-
sisted of a circular list of assembly-like instructions (its“genome”),
which were executed sequentially on virtual hardware allo-
cated to that organism. This virtual hardware comprised
three 32-bit registers, two stacks, and a CPU, which had
four heads that controlled the execution ﬂow of the organ-
ism’s genome and aided in self-replication. The instruction
set available to organisms was Turing complete, so organ-
isms could feasibly perform any possible calculation. Each
organism resided independently in its own cell in a 100x100-
cell bounded lattice, where each cell had eight neighbors.
When an organism replicated, it created a copy of itself and
placed this o spring into a random cell in the neighborhood,
replacing any organism residing in that cell. By choosing
neighboring cells, we limited dispersal and increased the
likelihood that interactions would be among kin. Because
an organism can be killed by new o spring, these environ-
ments presented a pressure to replicate quickly. Typically
in Avida, organisms can replicate more often by shortening
their genomes through mutations or by executing instruc-
tions more quickly.
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Figure 1: Representation of a digital organism (top)
in an Avida population (bottom) [11]
As in other studies using Avida [14], organisms competed
in this environment by completing logic tasks, which con-
ferred a merit bonus. An organism with more merit received
proportionally more CPU cycles, enabling it to execute its
144Table 1: Logic tasks that could be completed by or-
ganisms. Upon completion, an organism was given
the corresponding merit reward. The completion of
OR NOT was not rewarded, but resulted in the pro-
duction of beneﬁcial public good at the organism’s
cell.
Task Input Output Merit Bonus
NOT A ¬A 2
NAND A,B ¬(A   B) 2
AND A,B A   B 4
OR A,B A   B 8
AND NOT A,B A  ¬B,¬A   B 8
NOR A,B ¬(A   B) 16
XOR A,B (A  ¬B)   (¬A   B) 16
EQU A,B (A   B)   (¬A  ¬B) 32
OR NOT A,B A  ¬B,¬A   B 0
genome faster and thus spread in the environment. These
rewards were given at most once per task completed. In or-
der to complete a task, an organism ﬁrst had to execute the
IO instruction, which placed randomly-generated numbers
into its registers. The organism was then required to exe-
cute the instructions necessary to complete the task, place
the result in the correct output register, and issue an addi-
tional IO instruction. A full list of the tasks available and
their rewards is listed in Table 1.
In addition, an organism required a su cient amount of
a resource in order to complete each task. This resource
ﬂowed evenly into each cell in the environment and dissolved
at a rate of 1% per update (Avida’s unit of time, further ex-
plained later). In this study, the inﬂow rates were varied,
ranging from extremely limiting (equilibrium of 1 unit per
cell) to e ectively unlimited (equilibrium of 100 units per
cell), where organisms were unable to complete tasks quickly
enough to deplete the resource. For this work, each task con-
sumed 1 unit of this resource. However, tasks had varying
metabolic costs, or the number of instructions required for
their completion, as is shown in Figure 2.
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Figure 2: Sample genome segments required to com-
plete several tasks given adequate resources. (a) The
NAND task can be completed with 5 instructions, while
(b) OR NOT requires 6. More di cult tasks such as (c)
XOR and (d) EQU require 15 and 19 instructions, re-
spectively.
An organism replicated by ﬁrst allocating additional space
in their genome to create a copy of itself. It then copied in-
structions from its genome into this new area line by line.
Once this process was completed, the genome was cleaved,
and the new organism was placed into a neighboring cell.
As an organism copied its genome, instructions were mod-
iﬁed with a probability of 0.0075, and as the organism di-
vided, instructions were added or deleted with a probability
of 0.05. Populations were seeded with a single organism
capable only of replication. Any additional behaviors were
evolved through mutations introduced during the replication
process.
2.1 Virtual Bioﬁlms
We adopted the concept of a virtual bioﬁlm from previous
work [6] as the model for our experiments. As in nature,
an organism’s membership in a virtual bioﬁlm provided it
with some beneﬁt that it could not easily obtain in a free
or planktonic state. In our digital environment, being in a
bioﬁlm allowed organisms to survive a periodic “kill” event
similar to grazing by higher organisms in nature.
To create a virtual bioﬁlm, organisms completed the OR
NOT task, which resulted in one unit of a public good being
placed into the environment at their cell. This cooperative
resource can be likened to EPS, enzymes, or other beneﬁcial
products commonly observed in bioﬁlms. Unlike the other
available tasks, OR NOT did not confer a merit reward (see
Table 1); however, the product that it produced could enable
that organism or its kin to avoid being killed, as discussed
shortly. We therefore deﬁne cooperators as organisms who
performed this task at some point during their lifetime, while
cheaters focused solely on rewarded tasks.
A kill event periodically selected a focal cell at random,
and each cell in a neighborhood comprising cells within a 5-
cell radius (121 cells in total, or 1.21% of the environment)
was examined. If the mean level of public good in these cells
was below a threshold of 3 units, all organisms residing in
that region were killed. This public good both decayed at
1% and di used into neighboring cells at 1% per update. In
this environment, cheaters could exploit both the di usion
of public good from neighboring cooperator cells as well as
the kill event’s consideration of the mean public good level
within a neighborhood to beneﬁt from the production by
neighbors while refraining from producing the public good.
Starting from a single seed organism, populations evolved
in environments with di erent resource abundances for 50,000
updates. These abundances corresponded to equilibrium cell
levels of 1, 2, 4, 8, 10, 20, 40, 60, 80, and 100 units per cell.
During each update, each organism executed 30 instructions
on average. Those organisms with higher merit executed
proportionally more instructions per update than those with
less. Between approximately 6,000 and 8,000 generations
were observed in each of these runs. For each conﬁguration,
30 independent populations were evolved. Each of these
runs started with a di erent random seed, allowing each to
explore di erent evolutionary paths. The kill event was ex-
ecuted every update starting with update 1,000, which then
gave organisms a 1.21% chance of residing within a selected
region.
3. RESULTS
As observed in studies of bacterial populations [3], the
fraction of cooperators in our digital populations increased
145with increasing resource abundance. In each of the di erent
environments examined in this study, however, some pop-
ulations were unable to escape the kill event in the early
stages. This occurred when a population was small and had
not had su cient time to evolve public good production.
The results reported here correspond with the populations
that were able to run for the allotted time. For each data
set shown in Figures contained in this section, the number of
completed runs is indicated in each plot. Additionally, plots
show data from a representative subset of the completed
runs in order to improve readability.
Improved Response to the Kill Event—The frac-
tions of organisms selected and killed by the kill event is
shown in Figure 3. Here, organisms in high resource envi-
ronments were able to produce enough public good so that
approximately 70-80% of organisms successfully avoided be-
ing killed, while organisms in lower resource environments
produced signiﬁcantly less public good and were killed ap-
proximately 70% of the time. Interestingly, there is no clear
relationship between the amount of resource available and
the fraction of organisms that were able to avoid being killed.
In fact, there is little di erence in kill rates among environ-
ments with stable resource levels of 40 units per cell and
above (in 3 out of 4 environments, however, these di er-
ences are signiﬁcant; p<0.002). There is also little di er-
ence among those in environments with levels of 10 units
per cell and below (3 out of 5 runs were signiﬁcantly dif-
ferent; p<10
 6). These two qualitative groups, however,
are signiﬁcantly di erent (p<10
 6) from each other, which
indicates a clear di erence in behaviors. This could be in-
dicative of a critical resource level, below which cooperation
is not favored, but above which cooperation occurs at rel-
atively similar levels. This observation matches Hamilton’s
equation (Equation 1), which indicates whether or not co-
operation can occur under a given set of conditions. In this
case, organisms have found it beneﬁcial to cooperate in en-
vironments with su cient resource; however, an increase in
cooperative behavior has not proven to be more beneﬁcial,
so all populations maintain this behavior with the minimum
required investment.
Increasing Levels of Public Good Produced—The
observed survival in these adverse environments is due to
above-threshold levels of public good existing in selected re-
gions. The amount of this product created within these
populations is shown in Figure 4. The populations that we
observed to be most successful at preventing being killed
were able to produce a mean per-cell level of resource well
above the 3-unit threshold, while those in lower resource
environments produced signiﬁcantly less. As before, the dif-
ferences within each of these two groups are minimal, indi-
cating that there appears to be a level of required resource
below which the cooperative act is too costly. Populations
in the environment with a resource level of 20 units per cell
were signiﬁcantly di erent than these groups (p<10
 6),
indicating their level may be nearer to this critical value.
Increased Abundance of Cooperators—In popula-
tions that produce levels of public good well above the kill
threshold, there is a large potential for cheaters to emerge
that take advantage of this surplus. Figure 5 plots the frac-
tion of cooperators present in the di erent populations. We
deﬁne cooperators as organisms that perform the public-
good-producing task at least once during their lifetime, while
cheaters focused solely on rewarded tasks. We see that pop-
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Figure 3: Fraction of organisms in di erent re-
source environments residing in the selected region
that were killed by the kill event. As available re-
source increased, more organisms resided in cells
with above-threshold public good levels, indicating
that organisms were completing more cooperative
tasks. Data are averaged over all completed runs
(number is indicated in legend).
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Figure 4: Per-cell level of public resource in runs
with di ering resource levels in environments with
the neighborhood kill event. Organisms in high re-
source environments produced levels of public re-
source per cell that were above the kill threshold of
3.0. Data are averaged over all completed runs.
146ulations are comprised of more cooperators when resource
is abundant. This could be an indication of the decreased
relative costs of cooperation in high resource environments:
Organisms continue to compete through their completion
of rewarded tasks, while cooperation remains as a common
feature. Although a signiﬁcant increase in the fraction of
cooperators is observed in rich environments, cooperators
remained less frequent than cheaters.
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Figure 5: Fraction of cooperators in populations
with di erent resource levels. Cooperators are de-
ﬁned as organisms that completed at least one OR
NOT task, which produced public resource. Data are
averaged over all completed runs.
Skewed Distribution of Public Goods—One explana-
tion for both the abundance of cheaters and the production
of public good well above the threshold is that cooperators
are producing enough resource to support their entire popu-
lations. In this case, we would expect to see a fairly uniform
distribution of this resource throughout the environment.
Figures 6 and 7, however, show that this is not the case,
and that both cooperators and public good abundance ex-
ist mostly in patches, which is common among cooperative
systems with spatial structure [16]. Here at update 45,000,
the mean per-cell level is above the kill threshold, yet 36%
of cells are below this threshold due to the 58% cheaters in
this population. These patches are continually attacked by
cheaters, who reproduce more quickly and take over cells.
However, once large clusters of cheaters form, they become
susceptible to the kill event when the public resource de-
cays and they can no longer take advantage of cooperating
neighbors. These newly-vacated cells then become available
to cooperators, and these oscillations continue. Figure 8
shows these dramatic oscillations between cooperators and
cheaters within a selected 5x5-cell region during evolution
in a typical high-resource environment. Although mean per-
cell resource levels continue to rise in resource-rich environ-
ments, spatial constraints prohibit cheaters from invading
and simply surviving from the resource produced earlier.
Videos capturing these dynamics are available on our web-
site
1.
1http://www.cse.msu.edu/thinktank
Figure 6: Distribution of public resource in a typ-
ical high-resource environment at update 45,000.
White indicates cells with above-threshold levels
while black indicates cells with below-threshold lev-
els. Videos showing this distribution over an entire
run are available on our website
1.
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Figure 7: Distribution of public resource among cells
in a typical high-resource environment at update
45,000. We see that a small number of cells have
public resource levels much higher than others. The
inclusion of such cells in any target area is likely to
greatly assist in preventing the kill event from suc-
ceeding. In this 100x100-cell environment without
periodic boundary conditions, cells in the ﬁrst row
were labeled 0-99, cells in the second 100-199, and
so on.
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Figure 8: Oscillating fractions of cooperators and
cheaters present within a selected 5x5-cell region in
one sample population in a high-level resource envi-
ronment.
Overall Increase in Task Completion–In addition to
avoiding the kill event, organisms also competed for space
in these environments. Therefore, they faced pressure to
complete rewarded tasks, enabling them to execute and re-
produce more quickly. Figure 9 plots the number of re-
warded tasks completed in di erent environments. Here
we see that organisms in low-resource environments com-
pleted these tasks roughly in proportion to the level of re-
source available, indicating that this resource was limiting.
Those organisms in high-resource environments, however,
completed roughly the same number of tasks regardless of
the level in their environments. In these environments, re-
source was not a limiting factor. Figure 10 shows the number
of public-good-producing tasks completed. Here, the trends
are similar among high-resource environments, and popula-
tions in low resource environments show a consistently-low
cooperative e ort. Overall, populations completed this co-
operative task an order of magnitude less often than the
rewarded tasks, indicating that competition remains the pri-
mary driving force in these environments.
Finally, Figure 11 plots the total number of tasks com-
pleted. We can see that in all populations, the competitive
behaviors make up a much larger portion of the total number
of tasks completed. However, those populations with inter-
mediate resource availability and where cooperation occurs
(e.g. equilibrium resource levels of 20 and 40) seemed to
complete more tasks overall than would be predicted if the
trends seen among lower-resource environments continued.
This could indicate that cooperation enabled these popula-
tions to be more successful at competing in the task envi-
ronment.
4. CONCLUSIONS
This study has demonstrated in digital populations a phe-
nomenon reported in natural organisms: the relationship
between the availability of a required resource and the frac-
tion of cooperation observed in populations. We saw that
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Figure 9: Number of rewarded tasks performed by
organisms in environments with di erent resource
levels. Organisms in low-resource environments
were limited, while organisms in high-resource en-
vironments were able to continually improve. Data
are averaged over all completed runs.
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Figure 10: Number of cooperative, public-good-
producing tasks performed by populations in envi-
ronments with di erent resource levels. Data are
averaged over all completed runs.
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Figure 11: Total number of tasks, both rewarded
and cooperative, performed by organisms in envi-
ronments with di erent resource abundances. Data
are averaged over all completed runs.
as available resource increased, populations produced more
public good, enabling them to stave o  being killed by a pe-
riodic event. Interestingly, however, we observed this rela-
tionship between resource and fraction of cooperation to be
discrete. Above certain levels, organisms in all resource envi-
ronments cooperated at a consistent level, while cooperation
was consistently low below this critical level. We speculate
that this critical level is where the costs of the cooperative
behavior become less than the beneﬁts provided. Further
investigation of environments with resource levels near this
dramatic change in behavior could yield insight into where
this threshold exists and the true cost and beneﬁt structures
in these worlds. The presence of this critical resource level
lends itself nicely to future investigation into anti-infective
treatments. Following [21], this critical level could poten-
tially be used to determine the amount of non-cooperative
mutants to introduce to an infection in order to fall below
the critical resource level and suppress cooperation and its
negative e ects.
This work also measured the competitive, rewarded tasks
performed by organisms in addition to the cooperative ones,
which is rarely done in computational models of these be-
haviors. We found that even in populations in which stable
cooperative behaviors existed, organisms performed signiﬁ-
cantly more competitive tasks than cooperative ones. This
result indicates that even in environments where competi-
tion dominates, cooperation can still emerge and may in fact
enable a species or strain to become more competitive than a
non-cooperating one. We observed this as cooperative pop-
ulations in intermediate resource environments completed
more tasks than would be expected based on other popula-
tions.
We also observed large surpluses in the level of public good
in populations with signiﬁcant fractions of cooperators, po-
tentially supporting a large fraction of cheaters. We found,
however, that the majority of this public good resided in
clusters of cells which corresponded to clusters of coopera-
tors. Although this surplus made these cooperators suscep-
tible to invasion by cheaters, we found that cooperation was
still able to persist in the populations.
In considering the relationship between cooperation and
resource availability, many additional questions remain. We
have seen the e ect at the population level, but how does
the evolution of an individual’s behavior change in di erent
environments? Perhaps some level of restraint from cheating
can be evolved at the genetic level as has been observed
[23]. Additionally, plasticity [13] can play a large role in
the investment an individual makes in cooperation based on
the state of the environment and may signiﬁcantly alter the
percentage of cooperators that exist in populations, given a
ﬂuctuating environment.
Similarly, if the required resource is non-renewable and
will eventually be depleted, it would be interesting to investi-
gate the conditions under which populations evolve restraint
in its consumption or can instead shift their dependence to
another resource [1].
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